Conformance
The vectors are the authority.
A host is conformant, for the tiers it advertises, if it satisfies every REQUIRED clause of the spec and round-trips the published vectors with no skips. The vectors are not illustrative: each is a real, cryptographically computed value, regenerated by a generator and re-verified by the harness. A change to wire behaviour MUST regenerate the vectors and record it.
Content addressing (b3: + base64url over BLAKE3-256) and the canonical forms — deterministic CBOR for the receipt core, JCS for the attestation core — reproduce byte-for-byte. No float appears in any canonical form.
Given a grant set, the deny-by-default Enforcer returns the fixed decision for every query, including the negatives: a dispatch to an ungranted device class, a write to a read-only path, an egress to an unlisted endpoint — all denied.
A receipt round-trips through its JCR-1 envelope and verifies under the steward key. The per-device records sum to the total, the measured-coverage rule holds, and the provenance ↔ measured coupling holds for every record.
An attestation core canonicalizes to fixed JCS bytes and produces the fixed Ed25519 signature; verification accepts it and rejects a single-bit mutation. The attestation's device classes match the bound receipt's.
Given a grant set and isolation flags, the host selects the lowest tier whose guarantees satisfy it. A host that runs above or below the required tier fails.
A run record chains execute → suspend → resume segments, and its head recomputes from genesis. Resuming a snapshot that differs from the one recorded at suspension is refused, as is executing while parked or appending after close. Idle energy accumulates across parks; a tampered segment fails verification.
A devcontainer.json ingests to a canonical, content-addressed manifest whose address is invariant to key order and whitespace. Fields that execute commands or widen the sandbox are refused, and unknown fields are refused rather than silently dropped. A resume offering a drifted manifest address is refused.
Process control decides on the BLAKE3 of the executable's bytes. A denylisted hash is refused whatever the binary is named — it survives rename, move, and wrapper — and overrides every allow rule; a hash allowlist, when set, is authoritative over names; exec is still required.
A claim attributes the slot's accrued idle energy to the run and is refused unless the slot's environment address matches. An evicted, unclaimed slot records its idle energy as overhead, never zero. The pool's idle energy equals claimed + overhead + pending — nothing hidden.
Every item in a fleet proves against the merkle aggregate root with a logarithmic proof, across odd and even leaf counts. A foreign item on a real proof path fails to verify, and any change to a leaf changes the root.
An attestation without a mechanism canonicalizes to byte-identical JSON under the /1 profile, so historical signatures and published vectors still verify; one carrying a mechanism is /2, with the commitment inside the signed bytes. The commitment is injective across field boundaries. A mechanism at S0 is refused, and the relying-party check rejects a bare S1–S5 tier label while an evidenced one passes.
Malformed artifacts a conformant host MUST reject: a HwShunt reading with no measured figure, a folded-accelerator total, an unnamed accelerator, an S6 attestation without TEE evidence, a divergent or truncated replay, and a detectable mid-run grant mutation.
SEV-SNP report verification — a valid report that verifies against policy and VCEK, plus negatives (wrong launch measurement, a tampered body that fails the ECDSA-P384 signature) — and a hash-chained audit-log vector that must verify.
Negatives are what a standard certifies
A standard whose vectors only assert the happy path certifies nothing. The highest-value contribution is a new negative — a run a conformant host must reject. The vectors, not any brand, define what is correct.